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Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
By MARTIN KAmIcK*
Overwhelming is the realization of how far a law still built in
the ideology of Adam Smith has been meshed into the new order
of mass-production, mass-relationships. Overwhelming in no less
measure is the conviction that broad forms of words are chaos, that
only in close study of the facts salvation lies.
Against these conclusions stand others. The ad hoc approach
of case-law courts is sane, it cuts close to need, it lives, it grows.
And the work of law and lawyers in the contract field, however
little of the whole it constitutes, has vital meaning. It is both
hinge and key of readjustment. And how, without it, shall the
great gate swing open?'
Slightly more than ten years ago, George A. Steven purchased
a round trip airline ticket from Los Angeles to Dayton, Ohio and
deposited $2.50 in coins in an airport vending machine, thereby pur-
chasing a life insurance policy in the principal amount of $62,500.
Following the printed instructions mounted on the vending machine,
Mr. Steven completed and executed the policy form, naming his wife
as beneficiary. Whether Mr. Steven bothered to read the terms and
conditions of the printed policy form before mailing it to his wife is
not known.
Several days later, on his return trip from Dayton, Mr. Steven's
scheduled flight from Terre Haute to Chicago was cancelled. With
the assistance of the airline's ticket agent in Terre Haute, Mr. Steven
managed to charter an unscheduled flight on an "air-taxi" service to
Chicago. The plane crashed en route, and Mr. Steven sustained fatal
injuries. Relying upon a provision of the policy's "insuring clause"
that limited coverage to flights on "scheduled air carriers," as that
* B.A. 1971, Haverford College; J.D. 1975, Stanford University. Member, Cal-
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1. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
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term was defined in the policy, the insurance company refused to pay
benefits, and Mr. Steven's widow sued.
The trial court sustained the insurer's contention that the policy
was a "contract" by which the beneficiary was bound and that its
provisions excluded coverage for the particular circumstances of the
insured's death. On appeal to the California Supreme Court, a divided
court reversed. The ultimate decision in Steven v. Fidelity and Casu-
alty Co.2 should not prove surprising to anyone familiar with the liti-
gation record of insurance companies in the appellate courts, and the
decision could be dismissed as yet another "insurance case," in which
a court strains to find a rule of law that will operate to the benefit of
the widow and orphans.3
In fact, however, the opinion in Steven is worthy of note because
Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, was not content to rest the
rationale of the decision solely upon the ancient and familiar maxims
that too often obscure the actual reasoning of the courts in this area
of the law. Rather than relying upon the mechanistic application of
second hand doctrines, Tobriner in Steven looks through these accre-
tions to the heart of the law of contract and articulates a fresh principle
to accommodate the facts of the case.
To the extent that the opinion departs from the traditional ap-
proach, its application is certainly within "the leeway of precedent,"4
particularly because it is carefully limited to the "special circumstances"
of the case at bench.- While the rationale in Steven has been criti-
cized as being a "[b]ack-door" and "semi-covert" technique of miscon-
struction of contracts,6 it nevertheless represents a new direction in
the law of contract. Justice Tobriner's opinion, in the highest tradi-
tion of jurisprudence, builds upon established contract doctrine while
still following the lead provided by recent judicial distrust of insurers.
The plight of Mr. Steven's widow did not exist in a vacuum; rather,
its resolution represents a forward step in the historical development
of contract law and, for purposes of this Symposium, an insight into
Justice Tobriner's particular vision of the continuing process of re-
adjustment.
2. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
3. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
4. The phrase is a chapter title in K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMIMON LAW TAITION
62 (1960).
5. 58 Cal. 2d at 868-69, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
6. See Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1180 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Meyer].
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Background
The Theory: Freedom of Contract
The impact of the Steven decision is most fully appreciated within
the context of the deep reverence with which Anglo-American juris-
prudence regards the "contract." The notion that private individuals,
bargaining among themselves, can create and determine rights and
duties in each other that are enforceable or at least compensable is
compelling. More than a pragmatic concomitant to a sophisticated
system of commerce, the idea reflects a profound faith in the unfet-
tered responsibility of the individual7 In fact, by permitting parties
freely to enter into contracts and by enforcing the terms thereof, con-
tract law amounts to a delegation by the sovereign of its power to
make the law for a particular transaction."
The law of contract has both assisted and subsumed powerful
commercial and social forces in Anglo-American history. The famous
dictum by Maine in 1861, that society progresses from status to con-
tract,9 reflects his belief that these forces are ineluctable and inherently
beneficial. In the development of contract law itself, Sir George Jessel
carried this faith in the forces underlying contract law one step further
when he said, "[I]f there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires, it is that ... contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of
justice."' 0
This elevation of legal principle to holy writ has placed an un-
fortunate emphasis upon enforcement in the development of contract
law. Courts have often invoked the doctrine of freedom of contract
in sustaining the power of a party to enforce contract terms. The
more historically forceful and conceptually valid interpretation, how-
ever, may be that there is a privilege to enter into a contractual relation
7. M. R. Com, The Basis of Contract, in LAw AND THE SocIAL ORDER 69, 69-88
(1933) [hereinafter cited as M. R. CoHEN]; Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and
the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAuiF. L. REv. 1247,
1251-52 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Tobriner & Grodin].
8. M. R. CoHN, supra note 7, at 102-05; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629, 641 (1943) [herein-
after cited as Kessler].
9. H. MANE, ANciENT LAw 170 (London 1861); 6A CoRaim ON CoNTaAcTs §
1376 (1962); see Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1251-52.
10. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465
(1875) (emphasis added). Professor Gellhorn calls this belief the "emotional bench-
mark of the common law of contracts." Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination
Rights - Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 475 n.34 (1967).
and perform thereunder. That privilege is exemplified in the con-
tractual relationship by the principle of voluntarism: "Contract is that
part of our legal burdens that we bring on ourselves."11 A court must
display continuing sensitivity to the need for voluntarism within the
contractual relationship and distinguish those ostensibly contractual
relationships that offer only the "freedom" to "accept the terms offered
or else take the consequences.."1
2
A purblind emphasis upon the sanctity of contractual obligations,
without any examination of the relationships from which they arise,
leads not to contractual freedom but rather to contractual anarchy and
the attendant risk of tyranny. 13  As Professor Williston noted more
than fifty years ago, "Observation of results has proved that unlimited
freedom of contract, like unlimited freedom in other directions, does
not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare .... 14 The
problem, then, lies in the need to protect the obvious benefits of con-
tractual freedom while, at the same time, guarding against its abuses.
Those abuses are nowhere more apparent than in the modem phe-
nomenon of the standardized, printed form contract. The judicial
attempts to accommodate traditional doctrines to problems arising
from the form contract illustrate the conceptual limitations of the law
of contract.
The Problem: Contracts of Adhesion
Standardized form contracts have developed to satisfy a prac-
tical commercial need.1 5 Widespread use of such contracts has oc-
casioned much scholarly comment about their relative advantages and
disadvantages."6
Two aspects of the form contract are significant in the context of
11. M. R. COHEN & F. S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 102 (1951).
12. M. R. COHEN, supra note 7, at 86.
13. See, e.g., Pollock & Maitland's description of the feudal era's "free," if formal,
contract: -'[T]he law of contract threatened to swallow up all public law .... The
idea that men can fix their rights and duties by agreement is in its early days an un-
ruly anarchical idea. If there is to be any law at all, contract must be taught to
know its place." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 233 (2d
ed. reissued 1968). Bus see Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457
(1897).
14. Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 374 (1921).
15. Kessler, supra note 8, at 632.
16. See, e.g., Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917);
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939); Slawson, Standard Form Con-
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971).
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their mass use. First, like all contractual relationships, the contract
created by a standardized form creates law insofar as it defines within
certain limits the rights and duties of the respective parties.17 Because
the raison d'etre of the form contract is the economy of scale and be-
cause the form contract is designed to be utilized only on the mass
level, however, form contracts, in effect, create law in wholesale lots.
One commentator has even compared the significance of this mass
produced body of law to the other modem phenomena of "codifications
and restatements." 8 The courts are required to interpret and enforce
this law.
The second aspect of the form contract is merely a corollary of
the first. The law created in bulk by such contracts is by definition
indiscriminate in that it is intended for general, and not particular,
application.' 9 Thus the practical economies of scale associated with
use of the form contract, such as generalized terms, devolve upon the
identification, standardization, and limitation of risk.2 0  Moreover, be-
cause only one party to the transaction drafts the form, he predictably
includes generalized terms that cut broadly and uniformly in his favor.
These two aspects of standardized contracts are, of themselves,
neutral from the standpoint of public policy and the imperatives of
contract law. Standardization is an economic necessity and even a
social good, and the dynamics of the marketplace can control over-
reaching that falls short of actual or constructive fraud.21 Although
the terms of a standardized contract are not usually subject to bargain-
ing, the essence of freedom of contract and the controls of the market
are preserved if the prospective offerees are truly free to accept or reject
the offered form in its entirety. An additional factor, however, often
intrudes into this analysis, which severely strains the conceptual frame-
work of contract law. Courts have had to face the fact that, to varying
degrees, parties of significantly greater economic power have foisted
or imposed form contracts upon offerees who have no meaningful al-
ternatives. This absence of voluntarism, of course, characterizes the
contract of adhesion. The doctrine of adhesion contracts was con-
17. See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
18. Kessler, supra note 8, at 632.
19. See Bareno v. Employers Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 875, 500 P.2d 889, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 865 (1972).
20. The ironic observation has been made that judicial prejudice against a power-
ful defendant is among the risks form contracts are designed to minimize. Kessler,
supra note 8, at 631. See American Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bottum, 371 F.2d 6, 12
(8th Cir. 1967) (insurer should not be able to rely upon printed "countersignature"
on policy form as 'last act" to control applicable law on wholesale basis).
21. R. PosNtr, EcoNoNIC ANALr sis o? LAw § 3.7 (1972).
ceived in order to impose certain extracontractual standards on the
rights and duties of the parties to such a transaction.22
Although the attention given to the standardized contract is often
initially directed towards the terms of the contract, the doctrine of ad-
hesion contracts properly focuses its principles upon the relationship
of the parties to the putative contract. A contract of adhesion, which
forces one party to submit to its terms, violates the fundamental prin-
ciple of voluntarism, which is the essence of the contractual relation..2 3
In circumstances in which that element is totally lacking, of course,
the case is easy, because there is no contract at all.2 4  Yet, rarely does
the "take-it-or-leave-it" characteristic of an adhesion contract amount
to outright duress. The problem for the courts, therefore, is how to
adjudicate the relative rights and duties of the parties to a "contract"
when traditional precepts may operate to pervert the basic principles
from which the legal relation arises.
The Judicial Response: Legal Fictions
The nature of the problem presented by contracts of adhesion has
long been recognized, but the courts, bound by their sense of the im-
perative of freedom of contract, have generally not responded to the
problem in a creative or analytic fashion. Instead, in the time-honored
tradition of the common law, they have reacted to the equities of
particular cases, cloaking the result in legal fictions.25  As Kessler
noted:
[A]pparently, the realization of the deepgoing antinomies in the
structure of our system of contracts is too painful an experience
to be permitted to rise to the full level of our consciousness. Con-
sequently, courts have made great efforts to protect the weaker
contracting party and still keep "the elementary rules" of the law
of contracts intact.26
22. See 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1376 (1962); Kessler, supra note 8; Meyer,
supra note 6; Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833, 855-61 (1964); Comment, Contracts of Adhesion under California Law,
1 U.S.F. L. REv. 306 (1967). Although one court implicitly suggested that the nature
of the form contract itself controls, Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25
Cal. App. 3d 987, 993, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (2d Dist. 1972), such a contention
was expressly rejected in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552
P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976) (Tobriner, J.).
23. See note 11 & accompanying text supra. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note
7, at 1252.
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 494 (1932).
25. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 961; Meyer, supra note 6, at 1180; Comment,
Contracts of Adhesion under California Law, 1 U.S.F.L. REv. 306, 307 (1967).
26. Kessler, supra note 8, at 633.
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Courts have resorted to a number of doctrinal vehicles to accom-
plish this result.2 7 One example of particular interest, because it
constitutes the ostensible ground for the decision in Steven, is the
principle that any ambiguities in a form contract, which is written by
a party in a superior bargaining position, will be construed against
the drafter.
28
This rule is simple and clear and falls well within the traditional
boundaries of contract law. Often, however, the defect in the con-
tractual relationship is not ambiguity per se but rather the lack of
notice to the weaker party that the contract contains unfair advantage
to the drafter.2 9 The court which rests its analysis on ambiguity alone
invites inconsistency and uncertainty in adjudication. For example,
in one case a court reluctantly found that it could not stretch the
concept of ambiguity to include opaque contract language that was
taken verbatim from a controlling statute.30 In other cases, courts may
invent ambiguity where none actually exists and then construe the
ambiguity "contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract."31
Hence, the court which adheres mechanically to the rule of construing
ambiguity against the draftsman has the option either of allowing per-
ceived "wrongs" to go unremedied or of creating "remedies" based on
strained factual interpretation.
The Steven Case and Beyond: The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectation
With only the guiding principles discussed above to work with,
the Steven case came before the California Supreme Court. The
opinion commences with a discussion of the insurance policy in ques-
tion and, in particular, the provisions that purportedly excluded cover-
age. Although the court found ambiguity, the decision, written by
Justice Tobriner, does not rest upon a mechanistic analysis but rec-
ognizes at the outset that the rule of construing ambiguities against
the drafter of a form contract subsumes a more basic principle. The
opinion reasons that if an ambiguity exists in the terms of such a
27. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 6, at 1188-89.
28. 58 Cal. 2d at 868, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176; see Tobriner &
Grodin, supra note 7, at 1274.
29. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 994, 116
Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (Ist Dist. 1974). See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d
862, 872, 377 P.2d 284, 290, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1962).
30. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club v. Velji, 44 Cal. App. 3d 310, 315, 118
Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 (2d Dist. 1975).
31. Keeton, supra note 3, at 972.
contract, the court can often resolve it in more than just one way.
For the court to construe ambiguous terms in favor of the weaker party,
it must derive that construction from an implicit finding that the weaker
party reasonably expected such a construction. 32 Thus, the court first
examined the question of ambiguity
in the light of the purpose and intent of the parties in entering into
the contract, Mr. Steven's knowledge and understanding as a rea-
sonable layman, his normal expectation of the extent of coverage
of the policy and the effect, if any, of the substitution of the trans-
portation upon the risk undertaken by the insurer.33
The court noted that the insured's purpose in purchasing the policy
was clearly to obtain coverage for the contemplated trip. Because
interruptions in flight service are foreseeable contingencies, the court
held that a reasonable person in Mr. Steven's situation would reason-
ably assume that coverage would also extend to substitute transporta-
tion. Moreover, because the risk of injury on a substitute conveyance
would "in many cases" be no greater than the risk on the scheduled
flight, upholding the insured's expectations in this regard would not
expand the obligation undertaken by the insurer.34
The court next found that coverage was expressly extended to
substitute transportation but only via "land conveyance" arranged by
a scheduled air carrier.35  If, therefore, the court had mechanically
applied the neutral maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,36 in
"construing" the purported contract, it would have defeated the in-
sured's expectation of coverage, "protection for the whole, not part
of, the trip."3-, Instead, however, the court frankly acknowledged
that the "rule of resolving ambiguities against the insurer does not
serve as a mere tie-breaker; it rests upon fundamental considerations
of policy."'8  The court determined that a mere "legalistic" maxim
such as expressio unius should not defeat those policy considerations.8 9
32. Id. at 969.
33. 58 Cal. 2d at 869, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 870, 377 P.2d at 289, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
35. Id. at 870-71, 377 P.2d at 289, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
36. The rule expressio unius means that "the mention of one matter implies the
exclusion of all others." Id. at 871, 377 P.2d at 279, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
37. Id. at 869, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The court could have
relied upon casuistry to avoid defeat of the insured's expectation and achieve the de-
sired result.
38. Id. at 871, 377 P.2d at 290, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
39. Id. The fact that the rule requiring construction of ambiguities against the
draftsman is itself a legalism apparently did not faze the court, because it disposed
of other pertinent provisions of the policy under that rubric.
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Having established that "the classic rules of interpretation lead
to the conclusion that the policyI afforded coverage here,"40 the court
discussed those fundamental considerations of policy4' that lay at the
heart of its analysis.
42
A thorough discussion of the development of the doctrine of ad-
hesion contracts supported the court in holding that
[t]he company so arranged this transaction that Mr. Steven could
not possibly read the policy before purchase and could not practi-
cally consult the policy after purchase. The language of the policy
in itself was insufficient to afford the necessary notice of noncover-
age.... While the insurer has every right to sell insurance policies
by methods of mechanization, and present-day economic conditions
may well justify such distribution, the insurer cannot then rely upon
esoteric provisions to limit coverage. If it deals with the public
upon a mass basis, the notice of noncoverage of the policy, in a
situation in which the public may reasonably expect coverage, must
be conspicuous, plain and clear.
43
Although the holding in Steven is framed as merely an extension of
the familiar principle that courts will construe ambiguities against the
drafter of a standardized contract, the emphasis throughout the opinion
upon the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, as exemplified
in the passage quoted above, suggests that some larger principle is at
work.
This subtle shift in emphasis from a mechanical construction
against the draftsman to an approach respecting those reasonable ex-
pectations of the weaker party was continued by the court in Gray
v. Zurich Insurance Co.44 In another opinion by Justice Tobriner,
the supreme court held that a liability insurer was obliged to defend
the insured in an action for assault, notwithstanding a purported ex-
clusion from coverage in the policy for intentional torts. The opinion
provides that the "meaning" of the policy should be tested according
to the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage. Applying this
reasoning, the court found that "the duty to defend [is] a primary one
and since the insurer attempts to avoid it only by an unclear exclusion-
ary clause, the insured would reasonably expect, and is legally entitled
to, such protection." 45 The court then discussed the doctrine of ad-
hesion contracts, noting that, inter aria, "[o]bligations arising from such
40. Id. at 877, 377 P.2d at 293, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
41. Id. at 871, 377 P.2d at 290, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
42. Id. at 877-84, 377 P.2d at 293-98, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 181-86.
43. Id. at 878, 377 P.2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
44. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
45. Id. at 268, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
a contract inure not alone from the consensual transaction but from
the relationship of the parties."
4 6
Significantly, citations both to Steven and to Tunkl v. Regents of
University of California4 7 support the quoted passage. The latter
case invalidated an exculpatory clause under which the defendants
sought to avoid liability for the negligence of their hospital employees.
One of the grounds for the decision in Tunkl was the court's finding
that a hospital was "affected by the public interest" and was thus held
to certain higher standards in dealing with the public.
4 8
Read together, these three cases suggest that the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine is more than a rule of interpretation which courts
apply when faced with contractual ambiguities. The doctrine appears
rather to impose a positive duty upon the stronger party to an adhesion
contract to honor the reasonable expectations of the weaker party,
at least as to the scope and substance of significant obligations under
the contract, unless the stronger party has clearly and conspicuously
disclaimed that duty.
4 9
The traditional analysis of contract law can accomodate the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations as expressed by the Steven case.
Courts can look to the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
the substance and language of the contract at bench, the subjective
intent of the parties, and the familiar standard of the reasonable man
to find the duty imposed by the doctrine and to test the contract terms
against it.50 Because the scope of the reasonable expectations doctrine
is not entirely encompassed within contract theory, however, its ap-
plication may provide courts with the opportunity to develop fresh
principles of adjudication which are outside of, or at least ancillary to,
conventional contract law.
46. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (emphasis added).
47. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
48. Id. at 101-02, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
49. See Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 458, 469-71, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 271, 278-79 (1976) (Friedman, J., concurring); Logan v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 994-95, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1st Dist. 1974);
Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1275. Cf. Fritz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp.
514, 516-18 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (despite Texas law that ambiguity does not defeat right
of insurance company to set policy terms without regard to insured's expectations, mail
order solicitation through form contracts imposes higher duty on company). See
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell, 402 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968) (despite oppor-
tunity, insurance company had no duty to explain coverage if terms of policy were
"clear and unambiguous").
50. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club v. Velji, 44 Cal. App. 3d 310, 319, 118
Cal. Rptr. 596, 601 (2d Dist. 1975). For courts that stress this interpretative approach,
the crucial issue is whether a particular "expectation" of the adhering party is "reason-
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The opinion in Gray quotes with approval Professor Kessler's ad-
monition that the task of the courts is to "determine what the weaker
contracting party could legitimately expect by way of services accord-
ing to the enterpriser's 'calling' ....,, 1 Mathew Tobriner, speaking
as a scholar, rather than a Justice, has suggested that "courts may de-
rive the reasonable expectations of the parties from their relationship
or status rather than from the consensual transaction itself."
52
The crux of the relationship between the parties to an adhesion
contract is, of course, their disparity in economic power;53 the use of
the complex and allusive concept of status in this context denotes
Justice Tobriner's belief that certain fundamental obligations should
inhere in and provide a limitation for the stronger party's power.54
able." Id. at 318, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 601. This inquiry is often fact-specific and leads
to difficulties in adjudication. See Roberts v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 452 F.2d 981 (9th
Cir. 1971); Keeton, supra note 3, at 970 n.15. Justice Traynor dissented from the
court's opinion in Steven, for example, on the ground that an insured would not reason-
ably have expected coverage for the "other than scheduled" charter flight. 58 Cal.
2d at 885, 377 P.2d at 298, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The particularly murky logic of the
Interinsurance Exchange decision demonstrates the inherent problems of adjudicating
this issue in a principled manner. The court stated that although the insured was
entitled to assume that she had uninsured motorist coverage for her own vehicle, it
was doubtful whether she could reasonably expect coverage for herself when riding
in her husband's uninsured car. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 319, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
In another case, the First District Court of Appeal relied upon the principle of ex-
presdio unius est exclusio alterius, discounted in the Steven case, to find that special
notice of a certain exclusion from coverage in an insurance policy gave rise to a reason-
able expectation that no other exclusions existed. The court overruled the trial court's
understandable holding that a reasonable insured would expect the consequences of
felony drunk driving to be excluded from coverage under an accidental death policy.
Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1st Dist. 1974). By contrast, the Second District took judicial notice of "the well
known hazards of Mexican driving" in finding that an expectation of coverage under
an automobile insurance policy was unreasonable. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Harmon, 42
Cal. App. 3d 805, 810, 117 Cal. Rptr. 117, 120 (2d Dist. 1974), hearing denied, id.
at 816, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
51. 65 Cal. 2d at 270, 419 P.2d at 172, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 108, (quoting Kessler,
supra note 8, at 637).
52. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1273 (emphasis added).
53. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710, 552 P.2d 1178,
1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1976) (Tobriner, J.); see notes 22-23 & accompany-
ing text supra.
54. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1252-54; Rintala, The Supreme Court
of California 1968-69, Foreword: "Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CALi.
L. Rv. 80 (1970). One scholar noted over 50 years ago that "the question is not
so much one of status and contract as it is of a broader classification that embraces
those concepts: standardized relations and individualized relations. . . . [A] rela-
tion results in which the details of legal rights and duties are determined not by ref-
erence to the particular intentions of the parties, but by reference to some. standard
Justice Tobriner has been deeply concerned with the responsibility
of the law to protect the individual from the abuses of concentrated
economic power, 5  and his opinions in Steven and Gray are informed
with an understanding that the adhesion contract is but a manifestation
of this larger problem. As discussed above, the contract of adhesion
is to some extent a perversion of freedom of contract. 56 To the same
extent, the judiciary may have to refer to principles outside the ambit
of traditional contract law in order to resolve that problem.5 7  Further,
the stronger party to an adhesion contract may occupy a position
vis-a-vis the public analogous to that of a monopoly 58 or a public
service enterprise.5 9 Fortunately such status has traditionally carried
concomitant responsibilities under the common law.60 In fashioning
the doctrine of reasonable expectations, Justice Tobriner has provided
the conceptual framework for developing similar protections against
abuses of the adhesion contract.
To the extent that the principle of voluntarism is respected in
such a contract and the obligations of the stronger party conform to
the reasonable expectations of the subscribing public,6' courts should
respect the law of the contract and hold the parties to their bargain.
If the terms of the contract defeat such expectations, the imperative
of freedom of contract will still preserve the contract's validity if the
weaker party had notice and therefore an adequate opportunity to
evaluate the contract's shortcomings. The vocation of a particular
party or its bargaining power may also create certain expectations that
are extrinsic to the contractual relation. Courts should enforce such
expectations regardless of the contract's terms. Justice Tobriner has
demonstrated the potential scope of this aspect of the reasonable
expectations doctrine.
set of rules made for them. In origin, these relations are, of course, contractual; in
their workings, they recall the regime of status." Isaacs, The Standardizing of Con-
tracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917) (footnote omitted).
55. See, e.g., Tobriner, Individual Rights in an Industrialized Society, 54 A.B.A.J.
21 (1968).
56. See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
57. Fritz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514, 518 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (use of
reasonable expectations test by courts reflects inapplicability of traditional contract
theory to mass marketing of form contracts).
58. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 505 (1967).
59. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1253. See Muelder v. Western Grey-
hound Lines, 8 Cal. App. 3d 319, 333, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (4th Dist. 1970).
60. See note 54 supra.
61. The court determines the reasonable expectations of the weaker public from
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See note 50 supra.
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Although Steven specifically involved an insurer, its decision sug-
gests that the stronger party to any similar adhesion contract "cannot
by the most certain and understandable language negate the essence
of his bargain." 62  A court may find that one party to a purported
contract is subject, by virtue of his "status," to a certain irreducible
duty or fundamental obligation which he cannot disclaim, notwith-
standing the express terms of the contract. 3 Within the framework
of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, this holding could be based
upon the court's finding that any disclaimer would be so "fundamen-
tally unconscionable" as to defeat the expectations of the vast majority
of adhesion contract offerees.64 The foregoing speculation illustrates
the potential scope and flexibility of the doctrine which Justice To-
briner incrementally developed through the Steven, Gray, and Tunkl
decisions.
The world today is very different from that which shaped the
narrow notion of freedom of contract, and the glacial movement of
the common law must accommodate the changes. Justice Tobriner's
broader understanding of both the nature and setting of the problem
provides, for those who choose to accept it, the conceptual tools with
which the careful "work of law and lawyers" can forge the "key of
readjustment." 5
62. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 7, at 1275, 1278 (emphasis added).
63. See Insurance Co. of N. America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d
679, 689-90, 433 P.2d 174, 181, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (1967); Keeton, supra note
3, at 974-77; Meyer, supra note 6, at 1188.
64. Keeton, supra note 3, at 968-69.
65. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ.
704, 751 (1931).

